This Article Full Text (PDF) Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Mearsheimer, J. J. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Reckless States and Realism

Kenneth Waltz opted to reject the rational actor assumption in developing his theory of international politics. That choice, I argue in this article, creates three problems for his theory. First, it means that it is unsuited for explaining state behavior, which means it is of limited utility for explaining the workings of the international system. Second, Waltz's claim that his theory is well suited to explaining international outcomes — as opposed to state behavior — is unconvincing. Those outcomes are heavily influenced by the actions of the great powers, but if his theory cannot predict their behavior, it is unlikely to reliably predict the outcomes of their behavior. Third, Waltz's assumption that states often behave recklessly leads to a more competitive world than described in his theory. I conclude with the suggestion that the theory's greatest virtue is its normative value — its ability to explain how the world should work, not how it works.

Key Words: balancing • international outcomes • normative theory • rational actor assumption • realism • state behavior • status-quo bias • suboptimal behavior • theory of foreign policy • theory of international relations

International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2, 241-256 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0047117809104637


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?